Looking for information on it, I found this page, where a critique is offered. I quote:
John D. Collier wrote:
"The Laws of Form are equivalent to propositional calculus. Spencer Brown showed LoF -> PC in his book. B. Banaschewski showed the opposite entailment in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 3, (1977): 507-509.[...] As I guess people will start to wonder by now why we need Spencer-Brown then, if his algebra is merely equivalent to something which is very well-known, I want to remark that the axiom system of LoF is much simpler than the usual axiom systems for PC. Moreover, these axioms are derived from 2 extremely simple and intuitively understandable properties of the act of making a distinction.''That is intriguing enough to merit looking at those axioms. Another quote from the same page:
Laws of Form has received a mixed reception. Although in some circles it is treated with something approaching awe, there are detractors who dismiss Spencer Brown with extreme prejudice. Some dismiss him because of the formal equivalence between his logic and the Boolean / propositional logic it supposedly surpassed (cf. Collier's remarks above). Others are frank about having been put off by Spencer Brown's penchant for being cryptic -- both in his writings and in his behavior at meetings and lectures.Big question: could one find Spencer-like axioms for intuitionistic logic?